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From the end of October 1929 to the end of November 1929, the 
stock market lost over one hundred billion dollars in value.1 At the 
time, the loss represented over thirty times the entire federal budget of 
three billion dollars.2 By 1933, the nadir of the Great Depression, 
nearly 1,700 state chartered savings and loans had failed,3 and almost 
half of all home loans were in default.4 Compounding the crisis, the 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A. English, B.S.Ch.E., May 2001, Rice University. The author would 
like to thank his friends and family who have supported him through school, career 
changes, and even more school. The author also wishes to especially thank those 
people who provided much helpful criticism for this Note. 
1 CNN.com, October 29, 1929: “Black Tuesday”, http://www.cnn.com/2003/ 
US/03/10/sprj.80.1929.crash/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2007). 
2 NEW YORK: A DOCUMENTARY FILM (PBS 2007). 
3 WFS Fin. Inc. v. Dean, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1026 (W.D. Wis. 1999). 
4 In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 
641-42 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 
U.S.141, 159 (1982).). The case name changed between the district court opinion 
and the Seventh Circuit opinion because Ocwen changed its name and charter.  In 
future short citations, the district court case, In re Ocwen Federal Bank FSB 
Mortgage Servicing Litig., No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 2006 WL 794739, at *4 n.2 
(March 22, 2006)., is referred to as “In re Ocwen I.” The Seventh Circuit opinion, In 
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average household owed almost 20% of its income to creditors—an 
increase of over 10% from 1929.5 Forty-five percent of all farm 
mortgages were in default and home mortgage defaults were above 
38% in over half of twenty-two metropolitan areas.6 Ten million 
people were unemployed, and nearly four and a half million people 
had lost their homes and were living in the streets.7  
Many modern economists believe that the severity of the Great 
Depression is partly explained by the collapse of the banking system.8 
Afraid of runs and the increasing defaults on their balance sheets, 
bankers further tightened credit—hoarding cash to remain solvent, but 
depressing macroeconomic output and worsening the economic 
depression in the process.9 
During the Great Depression, Congress attempted to save the 
failing banking industry, expand credit, and prevent millions more 
people from being forced into the streets by enacting the Home 
Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 (“HOLA”).10 HOLA restored confidence in 
the banking industry and to end what President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt called the rapid “deflation which was depriving [through 
                                                                                                                   
re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 641-42 
(7th Cir. 2007), is referred to as “In re Ocwen II.” 
5 BENJAMIN BERNANKE, ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION 46 (2000). 
6 Id. 
7 Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial, The Path to Social Justice: Black 
Tuesday, http://www.nps.gov/fdrm/generation/btues.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 
2007). 
8 BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 42-43. 
9 Id. It is a situation that bears many similarities to the financial crisis of 2007. 
Banks are increasingly taking major writedowns on investments and, if they decide 
to maintain traditional debt to capital ratios, it could reduce lending by $2 trillion—
representing a severe tightening in credit in the United States. Bank Capital: 
Tightening the Safety Belt, ECONOMIST, Nov. 24, 2007, at 77. 
10 Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 §1, 12 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000). HOLA and 
the OTS only authorize and regulate federal S&Ls, not federal banks. Federal banks 
are chartered under the National Bank Act and administered by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”). Practically, there is little difference between 
S&Ls and banks, but the OTS mandate is much broader than the OCC’s. See 
Andrew T. Reardon, An Examination of Recent Preemption Issues in Banking Law, 
90 IOWA L. REV. 347, 363-64 (2004).  
2
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default and subsequent foreclosure] many millions of farm and home 
owners from the title and equity to their property.”11  
HOLA created a federally backed and administered system of 
savings and loans (“S&Ls”), and created what is now the Office of 
Thrift Supervision (“OTS”).12 The OTS is the agency charged with 
developing and administering regulations that provide for the 
“examination, safe and sound operation, and regulation of [S&Ls].”13 
Congress gave the OTS “the plenary and full authority . . . to regulate 
all aspects of the operations of Federal [S&Ls].”14 The OTS’ “plenary 
and full” authority means its regulations are “preemptive of any state 
law purporting to address the subject of the operations of a Federal 
savings association.”15 This authority allows the OTS to preempt state 
laws and regulate “the powers and operations of every Federal [S&L] 
from its cradle to its corporate grave.”16 State regulations and common 
law actions are valid only if they“incidentally affect the lending 
operations of Federal [S&Ls],” as required by the OTS preemption 
regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c).17 
Courts have generally interpreted HOLA and the OTS’ 
implementing regulations to pre-empt almost all claims against federal 
S&Ls.18 Even when federal law or the regulations do not provide a 
                                                 
11 Signing statement of Franklin D. Roosevelt on HOLA, June 13, 1933, in THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, eds.), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14665 (last visited Nov. 25, 2007). 
12 See 12 U.S.C. § 1462(4) (2000). The administrative agency has had several 
names since its inception. The most recent change was in 1989, when Congress 
renamed it the OTS. In re Ocwen Federal Bank FSB Mortgage Servicing Litig., No. 
MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 2006 WL 794739, at *4 n.2 (March 22, 2006). For 
consistency, OTS is used to refer to the agency or any of its predecessors. 
13 12 U.S.C. § 1463(a)(1) (2000). 
1412 C.F.R. § 545.2 (2007).  
15 Id. 
16 Fid. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 145 (1982) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
17 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) (2007). 
18 See de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 151, n.9 (providing a survey of relevant federal 
and state cases where state law was preempted by OTS regulations). 
3
Attaway: Cracking the Door to State Recovery from Federal Thrifts
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 
 278
private cause of action, the courts generally do not assert jurisdiction19 
because “[e]ven the States’ salutary effort to redress private wrongs . . 
. cannot be exerted to regulate activities that are potentially subject to 
the exclusive federal regulatory scheme.”20 Under much of the federal 
courts’ jurisprudence, national banks are exempt from state regulation 
unless Congress or the OTS explicitly authorizes the state regulation.21 
Recently, the Seventh Circuit decided In re Ocwen Loan 
Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litigation (“In re Ocwen II”).22 In 
it, the court explicitly rejected the OTS’ analysis of its own preemption 
regulation (12 C.F.R. §560.2), and expanded what actions only 
“incidentally affect” S&L operations.23 The court refused to dismiss 
the state and common law claims as preempted under HOLA.24 The 
opening, though limited, allows for some private actions against 
federal S&Ls and creates a less deferential test for what only 
incidentally affects a federal S&L.25  
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the historical 
development of the courts’ extremely deferential attitude towards 
HOLA and the OTS regulations, and the courts’ willingness to find in 
favor of preemption. Part II traces the procedural history and holding 
of In re Ocwen, and analyzes the court’s reasoning and support for 
creating a modified analytical framework for judging when state law 
claims are allowable. Part III discusses the competing interests on both 
sides of the state law preemption debate, and discusses how allowing 
                                                 
19 Silvas v. E*Trade Mortgage Corp., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1320 (S.D. Cal. 
2006). 
20 Id. (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 
(1959)); see also Haehl v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 277 F. Supp. 2d 933, 942 (S.D. 
Ind. 2003) (State tort law can only be applied to federal S&Ls when it “incidentally 
affects” lending operations and will not prove to be a regulation on a preempted 
area.); but see Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996) (State regulation of 
federal thrifts is permissible only when it “does not prevent or significantly interfere 
with the national bank’s exercise of its powers.”). 
21 Evan B. Berg, Interstate Banking and Consumer Protection: Curtailing the 
Comptroller’s Preemption Power, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 497, 502 (1996). 
22 491 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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additional state regulation and private causes of actions could both 
help and hinder consumer protection.  Finally, Part IV concludes that 
Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit reached the correct conclusion in 
the case and that, on balance, some limited state regulation of federal 
S&Ls will make the system stronger as a whole. 
 
PART I: THE COMPLETE HISTORY OF U.S. FEDERAL BANKS (ABRIDGED) 
 
For most of the history of the United States, the federal 
government has had a love/hate relationship with the idea of a national 
banking system; popular fears of large banks and “trusts” resulted in 
numerous state and federal laws restricting branch banking.26 The law 
and competition between state and national banking schemes kept the 
barriers for banking entry low and encouraged the growth of small, 
independent banks.27 Traditionally, bank failures in the United States 
occurred more often than failures in countries with centralized banking 
systems.28  Additionally, the smallness of U.S. banks made financial 
panics, or “runs,” much more devastating.29 It was not until 1933, after 
the collapse of the banking system, that Congress began to seriously 
regulate the industry.30 In the years since the New Deal, federal 
agencies have increasingly regulated the banking and lending 
                                                 
26 BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 44 (2d prtg. 2004). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 44-45. 
29 Id. A “run” on a bank occurs when depositors are afraid a bank may be 
insolvent and move to withdraw their money. A large withdrawal by depositors 
forces the bank to quickly liquidate assets. If the forced liquidation price is 
significantly lower than the assets’ value, the bank may suffer financial losses and 
actually cause the bank to fail. Id. at 45. 
30 The New Deal saw the rise of the administrative state. Beyond HOLA, these 
New Deal laws included the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1933) (regulating the sale of securities); the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a) (1934) 
(creating the Securities and Exchange Commission); the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 
U.S.C. § 377 (1933) (repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (Financial 
Modernization) Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1341 (1999)) (creating the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and dividing banks into commercial and 
investment enterprises). 
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industry.31 In the case of S&Ls, however, courts have adopted an 
extremely deferential attitude to regulations from the OTS.32  
 
A. Historical Development of the National Banking System 
 
Almost since the inception of the United States, the government 
has fought over whether or not a national bank was necessary. George 
Washington signed the charter for the First National Bank in 1791, 
although he had doubts that a national bank was constitutional.33 As 
originally conceived, the bank had private shareholders in addition to 
the U.S. government, and also had greater operating powers than state 
banks.34 In 1811, James Madison—a Democratic-Republican—
allowed the Bank’s twenty year charter to lapse.35 Just five years later, 
                                                 
31 See Reardon, supra note 11, at 363-64. Based on the economic evidence 
from the period, the slow financial recovery after the March 1933 “bank holiday” 
would have been must more difficult without extensive government intervention. 
The “bank holiday” was the period in March 1933 when President Roosevelt ordered 
all U.S. banks closed (“on holiday”) until the federal government could determine 
the bank was solvent. After a bank was reviewed and determined solvent, it was 
allowed to reopen for business. See BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 65. 
32 Reardon, supra note 11, at 358. 
33 R. Seymour Long, Andrew Jackson and the National Bank, 12 THE ENGLISH 
HISTORICAL REVIEW 45, 85, 88 (Jan. 1897). Hamilton and other Federalists saw the 
banks as necessary to create their vision of America as a commercial empire. For 
Hamilton, the bank offered the benefits of a uniform paper currency, better 
administration of public finances, more efficient tax collection, and a stronger 
national economy. TREASURY DEP’T (Alexander Hamilton), REPORT ON THE BANK 
OF THE UNITED STATES (1790), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES: INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL BANK OF 
NORTH AMERICA (Matthew St. Clair Clarke & David A. Hall, eds., 1832), at 15. 
Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans saw the federal government as having 
more limited powers. See Jefferson Versus Hamilton on the Bank of the United 
States, in AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, at 137 (Kermit L. Hall et al., eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter Jefferson v. Hamilton]. The Democratic-Republicans believed that since 
the Constitution did not expressly grant the power to establish a national bank, 
banking was a state issue and a national bank was unconstitutional. Long, supra note 
33, at 88. See Reardon, supra note 11, at 350-51. 
34 See Jefferson v. Hamilton, supra note 33, at 137. 
35 Long, supra note 33, at 88. 
6
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however, Madison chartered the Second National Bank to help 
underwrite the War of 1812.36 In 1819 the U.S. Supreme Court agreed 
to hear a constitutional challenge to the bank’s right to exist.37 The 
Court first enumerated the idea of implied federal powers in the 
Constitution and held that the federal government had the authority to 
create national banks and to preempt state laws attempting to regulate 
them.38 It was not until 1832 that the national banking system was 
again challenged.  
Andrew Jackson—the first Democratic president—was a staunch 
opponent of the national bank.39 Jackson vetoed the legislation that 
would have renewed the Second National Bank’s charter and wrote an 
impassioned veto statement denouncing the bank as unconstitutional.40 
When the Second Bank’s charter expired in 1836, the area of “free” or 
“wildcat” banking began.41 The era was characterized by state 
regulated banks that created “instability in the nation’s currency and 
frequent bank failures.”42 The idea of federally authorized banks 
would not arise again until the Civil War.43 The Union needed to 
finance the Civil War, but could not legally obtain funds in state bank 
credit, forcing it to demand payment from banks in gold and tightening 
the money supply.44 The National Bank Act of 1864 established a 
system of federally regulated national banks capable of printing 
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). 
38 Id. 
39 Andrew Jackson’s Veto Message July 10, 1832, reprinted in AMERICAN 
LEGAL HISTORY, at 161-62 (Kermit L. Hall et al., eds., 2005). 
40 Id.  
41 Reardon, supra note 11, at 351. 
42 Id. at 352. 
43 Id. 
44 Jonathan R. Macey et al., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 2-4, at 10 (3d ed. 
2001). 
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money and encouraged state banks to buy government bonds,45 but 
they were not a national banking system.46  
By the turn of the century, the general sentiment was that 
President Jackson’s views were correct.47 The banking system evolved 
into that of an “independent treasury” almost exclusively regulated by 
the States.48 A series of panics and runs on banks throughout the late 
19th and early 20th centuries, however, finally convinced Congress that 
a national monetary policy was needed.49 In an effort to provide 
greater monetary control over the U.S. banking system, Congress 
enacted the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.50 The system set up a 
decentralized national monetary system, but still did not provide for 
oversight or regulation of individual banks.51 Importantly, the Federal 
Reserve was not itself designed to be a consumer bank, but a bank for 
banks; it was meant to set broad monetary policy and to be a bank’s 
lender of last resort so that the bank could remain solvent.52 Although 
the Federal Reserve could set a broad national monetary policy, it 
could not ensure that banks operated responsibly. 
In 1933, the country had almost reached the nadir of the Great 
Depression.53 Following the stock market crash, there had been a run 
on banks and credit had all but disappeared.54 Over half of the counties 
in the United States had seen all their S&Ls close and roughly one-
fifth of the nation was without access to an institution capable of 
                                                 
45 The National Bank Act, 13 Stat. 100 (June 3, 1864) (codified as amended at 
12 U.S.C. §§ 21-216d) (2000). The purpose of the National Bank Act was to 
“provide a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and to 
provide for the circulation and redemption thereof.” See § 38.  
46 Id. 
47 Long, supra note 33, at 99. 
48 Id. See also BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 45 (2d prtg. 2004) (noting that until 
the Great Depression, panics were contained by “loose organizations of urban 
banks” that provided stability). 
49 BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 45. 




53  BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 47-48, 62. 
54 See generally BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 41-69. 
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providing a mortgage.55 In the wake of the collapse of the state 
banking system and the severe contraction of credit to homeowners, 
Congress enacted HOLA.56 HOLA created a system of federally-
backed and federally-regulated S&Ls to help ensure they would be 
“permanent associations to promote the thrift of the people in a 
cooperative manner, to finance their homes and the homes of their 
neighbors.”57 
 
B. The OTS Regulations 
 
To regulate federally-backed banks, Congress created the OTS 
under the Department of the Treasury.58 HOLA gave the OTS “plenary 
authority to issue regulations governing federal savings and loans.”59 
The language creating the OTS “expresses no limits on [its] authority 
to regulate” and even the Supreme Court has noted that “it would have 
been difficult for Congress to have given the [OTS] a broader 
mandate.”60  
From this grant of authority, the OTS developed regulations, 
including regulations governing its power to preempt state law.61 The 
OTS is “authorized to promulgate regulations that preempt state laws 
affecting the operations of federal savings associations when deemed 
appropriate to facilitate the safe and sound operation of federal 
                                                 
55 Fid. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 160 (1982).  
56 Id. In the wake of the financial collapse, many traditional lenders left the 
market almost entirely. For example, life insurance companies made $525 million in 
home mortgage loans in 1929, but only $16 million in 1934. In 1934, the year after 
HOLA was enacted, seventy-one percent of all home mortgage loans were made by 
the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (created by HOLA). See BERNANKE, supra 
note 5, at 64-65. 
57 S.REP. 73RD CONG.-NO. 91, at 2 (1933).  
58  de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 162. The original agency was known as the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board. OTS is used for consistency. See supra note 12. 
59 de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 160. 
60 Id. at 161.  
61 The OTS’ authority to regulate is outlined in sections 4(a) and 5(a) of 
HOLA. See 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2007).  
9
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[S&Ls].”62 The OTS regulations—which have been upheld by 
courts—explicitly give it the power to occupy the “entire field of 
lending regulation for federal [S&Ls].”63 With only very narrow 
exceptions, “federal savings associations may extend credit as 
authorized under federal law, including this part, without regard to 
state laws purporting to regulate or otherwise affect their credit 
activities.”64  
Because of the broad grant of Congressional power in HOLA, the 
OTS has, “without limitation,” exempted large swaths of S&L 
operations from state regulation.65 These areas include licensing and 
registration, credit terms offered to customers, servicing fees, 
disbursements, escrow accounts, insurance on mortgages, and 
insurance due on sale clauses.66 The narrow exception for state laws 
                                                 
62 See HOLA §§ 4(a), 5(a) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(a), 
1464(a) (2000)). 
63 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a). 
64 Id. According to the OTS regulations, “‘state law’ includes any state statute, 
regulation, ruling, order or judicial decision.” Id. 
65 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b) (2007). 
66 See 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b). (“Except as provided by the exemption section of 
the regulation, the following types of state laws are preempted without limitation: (1) 
Licensing, registration, filings, or reports by creditors; (2)The ability of a creditor to 
require or obtain private mortgage insurance, insurance for other collateral, or other 
credit enhancements; (3) Loan-to-value ratios; (4) The terms of credit, including 
amortization of loans and the deferral and capitalization of interest and adjustments 
to the interest rate, balance, payments due, or term to maturity of the loan, including 
the circumstances under which a loan may be called due and payable upon the 
passage of time or a specified event external to the loan; (5) Loan-related fees, 
including without limitation, initial charges, late charges, prepayment penalties, 
servicing fees, and overlimit fees; (6) Escrow accounts, impound accounts, and 
similar accounts; (7) Security property, including leaseholds; (8) Access to and use 
of credit reports; (9) Disclosure and advertising, including laws requiring specific 
statements, information, or other content to be included in credit application forms, 
credit solicitations, billing statements, credit contracts, or other credit-related 
documents and laws requiring creditors to supply copies of credit reports to 
borrowers or applicants; (10) Processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, 
or investment or participation in, mortgages; (11) Disbursements and repayments; 
(12)Usury and interest rate ceilings to the extent provided in 12 U.S.C. 1735f-7a and 
part 590 of this chapter and 12 U.S.C. 1463(g) and § 560.110 of this part; and (13) 
10
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arises when a state law “only incidentally affect[s] the lending 
operations of Federal [S&Ls] or [is] otherwise consistent with the 
purposes of [this regulation].”67 The regulation also provides one 
additional area that is not preempted and gives the OTS the ability to 
allow state or common law claims to proceed.68 The OTS may declare 
a state law not preempted if, upon review, it finds that the law: (i) 
Furthers a vital state interest; and (ii) Either has only an incidental 
effect on lending operations or is not otherwise contrary to the 
purposes expressed in paragraph (a) of [the preemption regulation].”69 
In interpreting the statute and the resulting regulations, however, the 
courts had to determine the level of deference appropriate to both 
HOLA and the OTS regulations. 
 
C. Judicial Deference to the OTS Regulations 
  
All regulatory agencies are not created equal however, and their 
regulations are subject to varying degrees of deference—both from the 
states and from the courts.70 With the rise of the administrative state 
after the New Deal, the tension between conflicting state and federal 
laws increased.71 To deal with the conflicts, courts looked to the 
                                                                                                                   
Due-on-sale clauses to the extent provided in 12 U.S.C. 1701j-3 and part 591 of this 
chapter.”). 
67 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) (2007). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. (“State laws of the following types are not preempted to the extent that 
they only incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal savings associations or 
are otherwise consistent with the purposes of paragraph (a) of this section: (1) 
Contract and commercial law; (2) Real property law; (3) Homestead laws specified 
in 12 U.S.C. 1462a(f); (4) Tort law; (5) Criminal law; and (6) Any other law that 
OTS, upon review, finds: (i) Furthers a vital state interest; and (ii) Either has only an 
incidental effect on lending operations or is not otherwise contrary to the purposes 
expressed in paragraph (a) of this section.”). 
70 For example, the OCC, which regulates national banks, has traditionally had 
much less authority to preempt state law than the OTS, which regulates national 
S&Ls. See Reardon, supra note 11, at 358. 
71 See Reardon, supra note 11, at 356. 
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Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.72 Based on the Supremacy 
Clause, courts developed a body of precedent that determined when, 
and to what degree, federal regulations would preempt (i.e. supersede) 
state laws and regulations.73 
 
1. Preemption Doctrine 
 
To determine whether a state law or regulation is preempted, 
courts first look to Congressional intent.74 Depending on 
Congressional intent, courts may find either express or implied federal 
preemption.75 In express preemption, Congress explicitly states its 
intent for the federal law to preempt state law.76 Even without explicit 
Congressional language, Courts may still find implied Congressional 
intent when the language of the statute requires preemption.77 There 
are two types of implied preemption: field preemption and conflict 
preemption.78 In field preemption79, the body of federal law is so 
encompassing that it makes clear Congress implicitly meant to  
                                                 
72 Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
73 Reardon, supra note 11, at 356.  
74 Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987). 
75 Gade v. Nat’l  Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (providing 
an overview of preemption doctrine). 
76 Berg, supra note 21, at 500. See also Bank of Am. v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Guerra, 479 U.S. at 280). 
77 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98. 
78 Berg, supra note 21, at 500. 
79 An example of this type of preemption would be immigration; federal law, 
and not state law, is responsible for determining whether an immigrant my legally 
enter the country, become a naturalized citizen, or be deported. Monica Guizar, 
Facts About Federal Preemption: How to analyze whether state and local initiatives 
are an unlawful attempt to enforce federal immigration law or regulate immigration 
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preempt state regulation.80 Conflict preemption occurs when the state 
and federal schemes are irreconcilable.81  
Determining the scope of preemption—often even express 
preemption—requires a detailed analysis to determine what, exactly, 
Congress meant to preempt.82 The problem arises because statutory 
language is open to interpretation by the courts.83 Courts do not 
generally presume preemption, especially when the federal law or 
regulations would preempt the traditional police powers of the states.84 
If, however, there is a significant history of federal regulation in a 
particular area, the presumption against preemption does not apply.85 
Traditionally, courts have held that the OTS’ regulation of federal 
S&Ls are so pervasive that they trigger field preemption.86 In fact, 
some courts have created a reverse presumption in dealing with OTS 
regulations—that state law is always preempted in the face of OTS 
regulation.87  
                                                 
80 Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).). This type of field preemption occurs in 
two situations: (1) the federal law and regulations are so pervasive that they leave no 
room for state supplementation or (2) the federal law and regulations are so 
dominant they preclude additional laws. Reardon, supra note 11, at 357.  
81 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98. See also Berg, supra note 21, at 500. Conflict 
preemption occurs when: (1) it is physically impossible to comply with both the 
federal and state schemes; (2) the state law or regulation thwarts the intent of 
Congress; or (3) state law preempts the implementation of the federal law or 
regulation. Reardon, supra note 11, at 358-59. 
82 Reardon, supra note 11, at 356-57. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 358-59. 
85 United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000). 
86 Reardon, supra note 11, at 357 n. 80. The Note catalogues several of the 
important historical Supreme Court cases where the Court has simply deferred to the 
OTS regulations. This presumption is important because it often shifts the burden of 
proof. The OTS’ regulations are presumed to preempt state law. Thus, the party 
challenging the regulation has the burden to show that the state law is not preempted, 
rather than the OTS having the burden to show that it is. 
87 Id. at 363-64. The article discusses the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bank of 
Am. v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 2002). The opinion 
concerned banking and S&L regulation (administered by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) and the OTS, respectively). The court noted 
13
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2. Applying Preemption Doctrine to the OTS Regulations 
 
The OTS regulations clearly evince a belief by the agency that 
Congress granted it the authority to preempt virtually all state 
regulation.88 But a regulatory agency’s determination of its power is 
valid only if the courts uphold both the grant of power and the 
agency’s exercise of it.89 If the courts decide that the Congressional 
grant is unconstitutional, they can limit the ability of the agency to 
make regulations.90 Even if the court holds the grant to be valid, 
however, they can hold that the regulation is outside the scope of the 
grant of power.91 
By the time HOLA was passed in 1933, Congress had already 
evinced a willingness to at least dabble in the banking industry for 
nearly one hundred fifty years. McCulloch v. Maryland first 
established the Constitutional basis for the federal government to 
create and regulate a federal banking system.92 Since the National 
Bank Act of 1864 and the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the Court has 
recognized that interpreting Congressional banking regulations was an 
                                                                                                                   
that federal banking was a traditionally preempted area and stated that it would give 
deference to the agencies’ regulations as long as they were reasonable. Interestingly, 
however, the court did not analyze the reasonableness of the regulations, but simply 
stated the regulations were reasonable. Id. 
88 See generally 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 (2007). 
89 See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). 
90 Id. (discussing the standard for deference to administrative regulations and 
decisions). 
91 Id. Chevron established a two step test to determine how much deference a 
court should give to an administrative agency’s regulations. First, the court must 
decide whether Congress explicitly delegated the authority to the agency, and, if so, 
the reviewing court must defer to the agency’s decision unless the delegation of 
authority was clearly unconstitutional. If Congressional delegation in the statute is 
ambiguous, the court will defer to the agency if the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable and the regulation is not clearly arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 842-43. 
92 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819) (holding Congress had the implied power to 
create a national banking system and that a state may not impede the exercise of that 
constitutionally granted power). 
14
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exercise in “interpreting grants of both enumerated and incidental 
‘powers’ to national banks as grants of authority not normally limited 
by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law.”93  
By the end of the 20th century, both the various circuit courts and 
the Supreme Court supported the idea that federal regulation of federal 
banks is so “pervasive as to leave no room for state regulatory 
control.”94 The courts have also held that the OTS’ regulatory power—
while leaving the states some room over traditional common law areas 
and incidental regulations—effectively preempted the field.95 The 
regulations receive a presumption of field preemption because “there 
has been a ‘history of significant federal presence’ in national banking 
[and] the presumption against preemption of state law is 
inapplicable.”96 Thus, judicial deference and the history of federal 
regulation grant the OTS wide latitude in preempting state law 
affecting S&Ls.97  
The OTS had promulgated its own interpretation of how its 
preemption regulations should be interpreted.98 The OTS guidelines 
use a two step analysis to determine whether a state statutory or 
common law action is preempted.99 Under this analysis, the court must 
first ask whether the state law attempts to regulate any area explicitly 
preempted by 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b)—even if the regulation would be 
indirect.100 If the answer is yes, then the state law claim is 
automatically preempted by HOLA and 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) cannot 
                                                 
93 Barnett Bank of Fla. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996) (tracing the history of 
preemption from McCulloch to the present day). 
94 Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th 
Cir. 1979), aff’d, 445 U.S. 921 (1980). 
95 Bank of Am. v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 558-59 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
96 Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. 
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000); Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33 (1996); Franklin Nat’l 
Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1954)). 
97 Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 
108 (2000); Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33 (1996); Franklin Nat’l Bank, 347 U.S. at 
375-76 (1954)). 
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“save” the action.101 Only if the answer is no may the court determine 
whether the law is not preempted by § 560.2(c) because it would only 
have an incidental affect on S&L operations.  
Finally, the OTS has taken the Supreme Court’s invitation to “not 
feel bound by existing state law.”102 For example, federal and state 
banks were generally not allowed to expand beyond state lines until 
1994, when Congress expressly permitted interstate bank acquisitions 
regardless of state law.103 Under OTS regulations, however, federal 
S&Ls were allowed to take over failing S&Ls in other states without 
regard to state law, and by 1992, the OTS had abolished all geographic 
limitations on S&L expansion.104 The OTS has continued to 
aggressively assert its regulatory preemption powers, especially in the 
areas of establishing branch offices, lending activities, and deposit-
taking activities.105 Recently, in 2003, the OTS issued opinions 
exempting federal S&Ls from state predatory lending laws in Georgia, 
New York, New Jersey, and New Mexico.106  
Because the Supreme Court expressly left open the question of 
whether all state regulation of federal S&Ls was preempted by HOLA, 
lower courts have been forced to determine the level of preemption.107 
For many courts, including the Seventh Circuit, the question has been 
answered with almost complete deference to the OTS regulations.108 
Only in a minority of courts and jurisdictions have any state 
regulations been allowed, even when there are only incidental effects 
                                                 
101 Id. 
102 Fid. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 162 (1982). 
103 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codifed as amended at 12 U.S.C. §1 (2000)). 
104 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s 
Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer 
Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 282-83 (2004). 
105 Id. at 285-86. 
106 Id. at 286. 
107 de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 159; see also Wilmarth, supra note 104, at 285. 
108 See, e.g., Haehl v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., 277 F. Supp. 2d 933, 942 
(S.D. Ind. 2003), Wis. League of Fin. Inst., Ltd. v. Galecki, 707 F. Supp. 401, 404 
(D. Wis. 1989), Moskowitz v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 768 N.E.2d 262, 264-66 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2002); Bank of Am. v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 558-60 
(9th Cir. 2002). 
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to the banking system.109 Generally, courts, including both the Illinois 
state courts and the Seventh Circuit, have been content to preempt all 
state regulation of federal S&Ls. As justification, these courts cite the 
long history of significant federal regulation, judicial deference, and 
the OTS’ interpretation of its preemption power. 
 
PART II: IN RE OCWEN 
 
In re Ocwen resulted from the consolidation of a number of 
complaints brought against Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”)110 
into a multi-district litigation (“MDL”) class action.111 By 2006, fifty-
one plaintiffs had joined the litigation and the Consolidated Complaint 
listed twenty-three different counts.112 In addition to federal claims 
under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act113 and the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act,114 the plaintiffs alleged violations of 
various state consumer protection statutes and common law counts for, 
among other things, fraud, unjust enrichment, and breach of 
contract.115  
                                                 
109 See, e.g., Gibson v. World Sav. & Loan, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 27-31 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2002); Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, 832 A.2d 812, 824-33 (Md. 2003). 
110 Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC was, at the time relevant for the litigation, a 
federally chartered S&L.  Although Ocwen did not actually originate home 
mortgages, it bought mortgages from other lenders and then administered collecting 
payments, premiums, and, if necessary, instituted forclosure proceedings. In re 
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
111 Transfer Order from the MDL Panel Establishing MDL 1604, In re Ocwen 
Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litig., No. 04-C-02714 (Apr. 16, 2004). 
112 In re Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB Mortgage Servicing Litig., No. MDL 1604, 04-
C-2714, 2006 WL 794739, at *1 (March 22, 2006). 
113 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a – 1692p. (2000). 
114 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 – 17 (2000). 
115 See generally Consolidated Class Action Complaint, In re Ocwen I, No. 
MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 2004 WL 3688469 (Aug. 23, 2004). The claims 
encompassed state laws in California, Connecticut, Illinois, New Mexico, and 
Pennsylvania. In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litig., 491 
F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2007).  
17
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The plaintiffs alleged that Ocwen breached their loan agreements 
by “ignoring grace periods, misapplying and failing to apply loan 
payments, improperly charging late fees, and force-placing insurance 
on properties already insured.”116 According to the plaintiffs, this often 
caused the plaintiffs to be unable to meet their payments, and resulted 
in Ocwen foreclosing on their mortgages.117 In their complaint, the 
plaintiffs sought statutory, compensatory, and punitive damages, 
restitution and an injunction against Ocwen from engaging in similar 
misconduct.118 
 
A. Procedural History 
 
On April 25, 2005, the district court for the Northern District of 
Illinois granted Ocwen’s motion for a partial summary judgment, 
dismissing a single contract claim, but specifically reserving judgment 
on the rest of the plaintiffs’ state and federal law claims.119  
In July 2005, Ocwen filed a motion to enjoin what was, in effect, 
parallel litigation in the Texas state courts by three Texas law firms 
that also represented members of the plaintiffs’ class.120  The district 
court enjoined the Texas proceeding, but was reversed on appeal.121 In 
reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit held that “[a]lthough 
an injunction prohibiting discovery could be appropriate in some 
circumstances, the broad injunction prohibiting all litigation [in the 
state of Texas] by the Texas law firms is not supported by the record in 
this case.”122  
                                                 
116 In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 2006 WL 794739, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 22, 2006). 
117 Consolidated Class Action Complaint, In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-
2714, 2004 WL 3688469 (Aug. 23, 2004). 
118 Id. 
119 In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2005). 
120 Prelim. Inj. Motion, In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714 (N.D. Ill. 
July 29, 2005). 
121 Id., see  Brief For Appellants, In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 
2006 WL 794739, at *8-12 (N.D. Il. Mar. 22, 2006); In re Ocwen I, No. 05-4268, 
slip op. at 4 (7th Cir. Dec. 13, 2005). 
122 In re Ocwen I, No. 05-4268, slip op. at 4 (7th Cir. Dec. 13, 2005). 
18
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During this time, both parties continued to file motions.123 Ocwen 
filed motions to dismiss the complaint based on preemption of state 
law claims, failure to state a claim, and for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.124 The plaintiffs continued to add new named plaintiffs 
and filed numerous motions to remand various issues to state courts.125  
In January of 2006, the parties and the district court agreed on an 
order for determining the numerous outstanding motions.126 All parties 
and the court agreed that most, if not all, of the state causes of action 
would be dismissed if the court found them preempted by the OTS 
regulations.127 Thus, the agreement stipulated that Ocwen’s motion for 
dismissal of the state law claims would be the first motion decided.128  
The district court ordered additional briefing in light of the Seventh 
Circuit’s order vacating the injunction against the Texas law firms and 
ruled on March 22, 2006.129 
In its ruling, the district court noted that “[s]tate regulation of 
banking is permissible when it ‘does not prevent or significantly 
interfere with the national bank’s exercise of its powers’.”130 The 
district court used this concept and the exceptions to federal 
preemption listed in 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) to allow the state law claims 
to proceed.131 According to exception six under § 560.2(c), a state law 
                                                 
123 See Docket, In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714 (N.D. Ill.). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 2006 WL 794739, at *2 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 22, 2006). 
127Id. 
128 Id. The district court ordered additional briefing on the issue because it felt 
that they related to whether to joined state law claims in the consolidated litigation 
could go forward. 
129 See generally id. 
130 Id. at *4, (citing Bank of Am. v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 
F.3d 551, 558-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Barnett Bank of Fla. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 
25, 33 (1996))). 
131 Id. at *4-5 (March 22, 2006). “State laws governing federal S&Ls are 
accepted for the following categories when they only ‘incidentally affect’ lending 
operations: (1) Contract and commercial law; (2) Real property law; (3) Homestead 
laws specified in 12 U.S.C. 1462a(f); (4) Tort law; (5) Criminal law; and (6) Any 
other law that OTS, upon review, finds: (i) Furthers a vital state interest; and (ii) 
19
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may regulate a federal S&L when there is a vital state interest and it 
would further the aims of HOLA.132 The court reasoned that consumer 
protection was a vital state interest, satisfying the first part of the 
test.133 The district court then reasoned that Congress intended for 
HOLA to protect consumers, and that allowing the state law claims to 
proceed would further Congressional intent.134 The court allowed 
Ocwen to file an interlocutory appeal to decide “whether . . . HOLA 
and its implementing regulations . . . preempt plaintiffs’ state-law 
claims challenging the mortgage-servicing activities of, and loan-
related fees allegedly assessed by, a federal [S&L].”135  
 
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion 
 
A Seventh Circuit panel consisting of Judges Posner, Rovner, and 
Sykes heard the appeal on March 28, 2007 and Judge Posner issued 
the opinion of the panel on June 22, 2007.136 Judge Posner, writing for 
the court, noted that HOLA does not create private rights of action and 
gives the OTS only limited remedial authority to enforce its 
regulations.137 In doing so, Judge Posner adopted the reasoning of the 
district court, and placed consumer protection above a general 
                                                                                                                   
Either has only an incidental effect on lending operations or is not otherwise contrary 
to the purposes expressed in paragraph (a) of this section.” 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) 
(2007). 
132 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c)(6). This is the language that the district court seizes on 
to deny Ocwen’s motion to dismiss. It is interesting to note, however, that the actual 
wording of the regulation gives the OTS, not the courts, the final authority to 
determine whether or not a particular state law meets the criteria. (“Any other law 
that OTS, upon review, finds . . .”). Id.  
133 In re Ocwen I, at *4 (N.D. Ill. March 22, 2006).  
134 Id. The court also took notice of the Seventh Circuit’s decision to allow the 
state law claims in Texas to proceed. According to the court’s reasoning, had the 
Seventh Circuit felt the state law claims had been preempted, it would not have 
allowed the Texas state law actions to proceed. Id. 
135 Appellants’ Opening Brief, In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 2006 
WL 2788080 (Sept. 13, 2006). 
136 See In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 
638, 643 (7th Cir. 2007).  
137 Id. 
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preemption of the field.138 The court affirmed the district court’s 
refusal to dismiss the complaint, but also provided an analysis of the 
state law claims—giving insight into which claims it thought were 
preempted and which it did not.139 
 
1. The Court’s Analysis 
 
It is useful to view the court’s opinion as having three parts: in the 
first, the court discusses the background facts and provides an 
overview of the law; in the second, the court formulates its own rule; 
and in the third, the court applies its rule to each of the claims.140 
Judge Posner first noted that the complaint “is a hideous sprawling 
mess” and that “the defendants [could] hardly be blamed for wanting 
to strangle the monster in its crib” with the motion to preempt most of 
the litigation.141 The court noted that “of course” Ocwen was correct 
that the OTS guidelines should be used to interpret the regulations, and 
even referred to the line between preempted and non-preempted 
actions as “both intuitive and reasonably clear.”142 Here, however, is 
where the party ends for Ocwen. 
The court stated that HOLA gave the OTS broad plenary power to 
issue regulations for federal S&Ls, and gave it some power to enforce 
its regulations, but it did not give the OTS power to adjudicate 
disputes between the S&Ls and their customers.143 The OTS could not 
provide a remedy to customers who were harmed by S&Ls who 
violated OTS regulations.144 The court also noted that consumer 
                                                 
138 Id. (“It would be surprising for a federal regulation to forbid the 
homeowner’s state to give the homeowner a defense based on . . . breach of 
contract.”); compare In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 2006 WL 794739, 
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2006) (“[C]ourts should be cautious in finding preemption 
in areas of consumer protection.”). 
139 In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 644-50. 
140 See generally id. 
141 Id. at 643. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. (citing OTS, “How to Resolve a Consumer Complaint 1-2,” 
www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/480924.pdf. (last visited June 5, 2007)). 
144 Id. 
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protection was part of the reason the OTS was created and given the 
power to regulate in the first place.145  
By emphasizing the purpose of HOLA, the court restricted the 
language of preempted areas to the actual language of the statute.146 
This restriction effectively expanded the definition of what it means to 
“incidentally affect” lending operations.147 The court recognized that 
certain common law remedies were enforceable—these remedies may 
affect S&L operations, but they do so no more than they would affect 
any business.148 For the court, requiring that S&Ls meet minimum 
standards of ethical business practice was only an incidental effect on 
an S&L’s operations, even if it forced the S&L to do something not 
required—or even allowed—by the OTS regulations. 
Interestingly, the first part of the opinion is scant on the law of 
preemption. The court only mentioned preemption in reference to 
HOLA, the OTS preemption regulation, and the OTS guidelines for 
interpreting the OTS’ exemption power.149 The court did not discuss 
how other courts, or even past Seventh Circuit panels, have interpreted 
the preemption authority Congress gave the OTS under HOLA or even 
how preemption of state law normally arises.150 On reading the first 
part of the court’s discussion it appears that the court will hold the 
OTS’ preemption regulation reasonable without discussion and 
summarily dismiss the state law claims. 
This approach would not be without precedent. The Ninth Circuit, 
in Bank of America v. City and County of San Francisco, noted that 
regulations must be reasonable, but accepted—without discussion—
that the OCC and OTS regulations were reasonable.151  Here, the court 
seems to accept—without discussion—that the OTS regulations 
preempt the field. Similarly, it appears here that the Seventh Circuit 
                                                 
145 Id. 




150 See generally Id. 
151 See generally Bank of Am. v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 
551 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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accepts as obvious that any state law or regulation that attempts to 
directly regulate the expressly preempted areas is preempted.152  It also 
states that “[i]t would not do to let the broad standards characteristic of 
[contracts, commercial law, and torts] morph into a scheme of state 
regulation.”153  Reading the outline of the law the court provided 
makes it initially appear that the court will side with precedent and the 
Ninth Circuit, and adopt an extremely deferential attitude to the OTS 
regulations.154 Yet precisely the opposite happens—after 
acknowledging the regulations and interpretations, the court proceeds 
to ignore them.155 
According to the court, subsection (c) of the OTS preemption 
regulation was not meant to “deprive persons harmed by the wrongful 
acts of savings and loan associations of their basic state common-law-
type remedies.”156 Judge Posner reasoned that Congress has the power 
to preempt any remedy other than those it prescribes, or to even bar 
recovery completely, but it does not do so often.157 When Congress 
bars recovery to an injured plaintiff, it is the exception, not the rule.158 
For the court, barring recovery is similar to federal preemption—in 
order for it to exist, Congress must clearly state its intent that the bar 
should exist and the reasons for the bar.159  
For the court, the OTS meant for state law to complement federal 
regulations and subsection (c) of the preemption regulation does so by 
upholding the basic laws and “norms that undergird commercial 
transactions.”160 The court reasoned that the norms will only 
incidentally affect federal S&L operations because the state’s 
objective—consumer protection—is not in conflict with the OTS’ 
objective of providing for the safe and sound operation of federal 
                                                 
152 In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 643. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 643-44. 
156 Id. at 643 (interpreting 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) (2007).). 
157 In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 644. 
158 Id. 
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S&Ls.161 Thus, the court held that despite precedent to the contrary, 
the general state commercial laws are not preempted precisely because 
they serve the same purpose as the federal regulations.162  
This interpretation tends to disregard the OTS guidelines for 
preemption that, just a few paragraphs before, the court had accepted 
as obvious. Additionally, the court—like the district court before it—
failed to follow the strict letter of the OTS’ preemption exemption 
subsection.  Both the Seventh Circuit and the district court based their 
opinion on a state’s compelling interest in protecting its resident 
consumers.163 Both courts coupled this compelling consumer 
protection interest with the idea that state consumer protection laws 
are complementary to the purpose of HOLA and the OTS in general.164 
And both ignored the part of the regulation that states that only the 
OTS can decide whether a law serves a compelling state interest and is 
complementary to the OTS regulations such that it should not be 
exempted.165 The court appears to give great deference to the 
regulations, but bases its fundamental argument on a power the OTS 
clearly meant to keep out of judicial hands. 
The court takes the same approach justifying its interpretation 
with OTS board decisions. It chooses only those decisions that suit its 
needs.  For example, the court cites to an OTS opinion that states that 
“[s]tate laws prohibiting deceptive acts and practices in the course of 
commerce are not included in the illustrative list of preempted laws in 
section 560.2(b).”166 The court ignores, however, the OTS opinions 
from 2003 that expressly preempted federal S&Ls from state predatory 
lending laws in Georgia, New York, New Jersey, and New Mexico.167 
                                                 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 644-45. 
163 See id.; compare In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-C-2714, 2006 WL 
794739, at *4-5 (March 22, 2006). 
164 In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d 638; compare In re Ocwen I, No. MDL 1604, 04-
C-2714, 2006 WL 794739, at *4-5 (March 22, 2006). 
165 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) (2007). 
166 In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 644 (quoting Preemption of State Law 
Applicable to Credit Card Transactions ¶IIC (Opinion of OTS Chief Counsel, Dec 
24, 1996, 1996 WL 767462). 
167 Wilmarth, supra note 104, at 286. 
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The court gives lip service to judicial deference without actually 
deferring to the OTS. 
In coming to this decision Judge Posner and the court had to at 
least partially break with the long line of cases where the courts 
refused to enforce any state law or remedy that might possibly affect 
some aspect of a federal S&L’s operations.168 By determining that 
common law actions that complement the intent of the federal 
regulations are acceptable, the court implicitly broadened the 
definition of what is incidental.169 And the court does so while giving 
the appearance of deference.170 The standard the court seeks to enforce 
is a far cry from accepting the OTS regulations as so “pervasive as to 
leave no room for state regulatory control.”171 “[N]o room for state 
regulatory control” is a clear statement for the states, and the courts, to 
practice extreme deference when interpreting the regulations and to 
almost always err on the side of finding preemption.172 
By holding that general business law173 can apply to federal 
S&Ls, Judge Posner and the court broaden incidental effects to cover 
consumer protection.174  This allows plaintiffs to recover when they 
may otherwise be barred by either prior precedent or the OTS 
regulations and guidelines.175 Rather than applying the idea of a 
pervasive field preemption, the court seems instead to rely on a 
conflicts analysis of preemption—only those laws that would directly 
interfere with the federal regulations are preempted, anything else will 
                                                 
168 See supra Part I. 
169 In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 643-44. 
170 Id. at 643 (In the opening of the opinion, Judge Posner noted that “of 
course” the OTS regulations were controlling and that the OTS guidelines should be 
used to interpret the regulations.). 
171 Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th 
Cir. 1979), aff’d, 445 U.S. 921, 100 (1980). 
172 Id. 
173 The court talks about general business laws as “state laws prohibiting 
deceptive acts and practices in the course of commerce.” In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 
644. 
174 See id. at 643-45 
175 See id. 
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be saved.176 Taken in this light, it becomes clear why the court chose 
not to set forth the varying standards of preemption. If the court had 
more clearly articulated the standard, it would have largely constrained 
itself to applying broad field preemption.177 By explicitly accepting the 
OTS regulations as binding, however, the court allows itself greater 
discretion to interpret the regulation as it sees fit. 
 This approach allowed the court to interpret the regulation for 
itself—rather than locking it into deference to the OTS. In doing so, 
the court seems to implicitly accept that even though business 
standards may differ dramatically from state to state, applying them to 
federal S&Ls is an acceptable intrusion into the federal regulatory 
scheme, even though it may force an S&L to conform to a myriad of 
rules for different jurisdictions. The court’s coup d’etat, then, is not so 
much which of the state causes of action are not preempted, but rather 
that the court’s new rule allows the courts—and not the OTS—to 
decide when state law would apply. 
 
2. Applying a New Standard 
 
The court then used its newfound authority and rule to state, in 
dicta, “which claims fall on the regulatory side of the ledger and which 
. . . fall on the common law side.”178 The court took each state law 
claim in turn, and determined whether it was: (a) clearly preempted, 
(b) clearly not preempted, or (c) possibly preempted but more 
information was needed to decide.  This Note does not attempt a claim 
by claim analysis—a process that the court undertook and that it called 
                                                 
176 See supra Part I. (discussing the different methods, relative strength, and 
presumptions of the various ways of finding preemption). 
177 The majority of circuit courts have accepted the OTS guidelines as 
controlling. See generally Wilmarth, supra note 104; Reardon, supra note 11, at 363-
64. Had the Seventh Circuit more clearly articulated precedent, it is likely that it 
would have been forced to follow the OTS guidelines. See, e.g. Bank of Am. v. City 
and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 2002).  The guidelines forbid 
reaching any exceptions to preemption if there is any effect on a preempted area 
listed in subsection (b).  See In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 643. 
178 In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 644. 
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a “tedious recital.”179 Reviewing the court’s analysis, a pattern 
emerges.180 
From the court’s discussion of which causes of action are 
preempted and which are not, it is clear that the court intends that only 
those actions which would squarely fall into the regulation of a 
prohibited area should be preempted and bar recovery. The court 
seems willing to allow more regulatory control by the states in an 
effort to do what it feels the federal regulations have failed to do—
protect consumers. 
First, the court held that only one of the seventeen state law 
claims was clearly fully preempted.181 Claim thirteen charged fraud 
and a “gross disparity between the value received by the class and the 
price paid”182 under the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act.183 
The court also stated that many of the claims were allowable 
because they alleged common law actions. For the court, the key to 
preemption was whether or not the claim had to be classified as a state 
law (which would be preempted), or whether it could be a common 
law action (which would generally not be preempted.) 
 These claims included additional breach of contract claims (claim 
five), violations of good faith and fair dealing (claim six), fraud 
(claims three, seven, and twenty), and slander/defamation (claims 
seventeen, twenty-one);184 the slander and defamation claims are of 
particular interest. Both allege that Ocwen committed a wrongful act 
by either: (1) instituting an lis pendens action against the plaintiffs 
without a valid basis, or (2) representing to third persons that the 
plaintiffs were in default.185 Recovery of some value of a bank’s assets 
through foreclosure seems to be intimately bound to the regular 
                                                 
179 Id. at 648. 
180 Id. at 644-48. 
181 See id.  
182 Id. at 647. 
183 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-1 (West 2007). 
184 See id. at 644-48. 
185 Id. at 648. 
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operation of any bank or S&L.186 Here, however, the court holds up 
both actions as “good example[s] of claim[s] that the regulation does 
not preempt.”187   
The court could not classify nine of the claims.  Of those, four 
included fraud or negligence allegations.188 Although these claims 
were brought under various state and common laws, they suffered 
from the same fatal flaw—a failure to provide enough information for 
the court to understand what was being alleged.189 Three of the claims 
alleged fraud among other clearly preempted actions.190 The court 
stated that the three claims were impossible to classify because they 
did not provide enough information, were not pled with 
particularity,191 and were impossible to understand.192  Similarly, the 
court stated that another claim was a bare assertion of common law 
negligence that could not stand without more information.193 The court 
also stated that it was unclear whether five additional claims would be 
preempted because it was unclear whether the plaintiffs allegations 
covered preempted areas or not.194  
It is the five unclear claims that provide the greatest insight into 
the court’s path forward, however. For several of the claims, the court 
gave the plaintiffs a roadmap to avoid preemption—at least as far as 
the Seventh Circuit is concerned. For example, one of the claims 
largely dealt with the fees charged by banks and deceptive advertising 
                                                 
186 As with any business, banks and S&Ls try to minimize their losses on bad 
investments. For banks, this means minimizing losses on bad loans through 
foreclosure and resale.  
187 In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 648. 
188 Id. at 647-48.  
189 Id. 
190 The fifteenth claim alleged fraud under the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Law. Id. at 647. The sixteenth claim, brought 
under the Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act, basically alleged 
“deceptive practices in collection,” but also included numerous references to fraud. 
Id. at 647-48. The twenty-second claim alleged common law fraud. Id. at 648. 
191 See FED R. CIV. P. 9(b) (requiring that fraud be pled with particularity). 
192 Id. at 647. 
193Id. at 648;  
194 See id. at 644-48. 
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practices.195  The court held most of the claims preempted, but 
provided two exceptions.196 In the first exception, the court noted 
claims of excess fees are generally preempted under the OTS 
regulations, but would not be preempted if the claim was based on the 
terms of the loan contract.197 Similarly, the court stated that claims of 
deceptive advertising are preempted if they are based in state laws that 
require truthful marketing, but are not preempted if they are based on 
common law fraud.198 In both cases, the court shows the plaintiffs how 
to make the claims allowable. 
The courts determination on when foreclosure fees are due also 
shows that the court is, to some degree, failing to faithfully defer to the 
OTS regulations and guidelines.  Under Ocwen’s mortgage 
agreements, the plaintiffs must pay all of the fees to foreclose on their 
house at the beginning of a foreclosure.199 The claim alleges that this 
arrangement violated Illinois state law.200 The court stated that the 
claim would not be preempted as long as it is based in a breach of 
contract action.201 Here the court clearly expands the definition of 
“incidentally affects.”   
Inherent in the court’s reasoning is a radical concept—an area that 
would be traditionally preempted under the OTS regulations (when a 
plaintiff must pay foreclosure fees) is not preempted if it is based on a 
common law action.202 Fees are an area clearly preempted by § 
560.2(b), but, as long as the issue is contractual and not regulatory, it 
only incidentally affects Ocwen’s operations.203 This holding clearly 
furthers the court’s purpose of allowing plaintiffs to recover under the 
common law, even though the claims, pled differently, would be 
preempted. It is an example of just how powerful the Seventh Circuit’s 
new rule can be. 






200 Id. at 647. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. See also 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b) (2007). 
203 In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 647. 
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In dicta, the court makes clear that its earlier decision to allow the 
alternative Texas litigation to proceed was not a fluke and that it did 
not fail to address the preemption issue.204 In In re Ocwen, the Seventh 
Circuit made a policy judgment. From the opinion, it appears the court 
believes that some state law claims should go forward, even in areas 
that would traditionally trigger federal preemption. The careful 
crafting of the opinion and roadmap to avoid preemption make it clear 
the court feels that states should—at least to some degree—be 
involved in the regulation of federal S&Ls that operate within their 
territory. 
To reach this outcome, however, the court must make an end-run 
around the pervasive OTS regulations and the OTS guidelines for 
interpreting preemption. The court attempts to strike a balance 
between protecting consumers through state law and ensuring that the 
common law actions do not preempt the federal regulations. The court 
first recognizes that the OTS has preemptive power, but then interprets 
the OTS regulations and guidelines in a way that gives ultimate 
control of what is preempted and what is not to the courts—not the 
OTS. 
 
PART III: TOO HOT, TOO COLD, OR JUST RIGHT? 
 
The question then becomes, how much state regulation is too 
much? Generally, courts have barely cracked the door to state 
regulation.205 Opening the door to even slightly more of state 
regulation of federal banks runs the risk of undermining the OTS’ 
authority to preempt state law.206 Undermining that authority could 
potentially undercut the power of the OTS to enforce its regulations. 
However, Judge Posner correctly pointed out that barring any state 
cause of action in blind deference to the OTS seriously undercuts the 
                                                 
204 Id. at 644-48. 
205 See, e.g., Gibson v. World Sav. & Loan, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 27-31 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2002); Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, 832 A.2d 812, 824-33 (Md. 2003). 
206 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2007). Note as well that the OTS has aggressively 
campaigned to expand its exemption power since the 1970’s, and has been largely 
successful in its expansion. See generally Wilmarth, supra note 104. 
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ability of consumers to recover because of a federal S&L’s bad or 
negligent acts.207 There is also the additional worry that too much of a 
good thing is a bad thing. An extremely deferential court that never 
challenges the OTS’ regulations runs the risk of concentrating 
unchecked power in the hands of the agency—which means that there 
is nothing to stop it from serving interests other than those in its 
mandate.208 
It is perhaps easiest to start with where the two sides agree. No 
one doubts that regulation on banks is necessary; banks are “an 
unusual mix of hazardous might and fragility.”209 Leading economists, 
including Ben Bernake, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, blame 
much of the length and severity of the Great Depression on the 
collapse of the banking system.210 Even today, banks’ balance sheets 
are composed of liquid debt (deposits that can be called immediately) 
and illiquid assets (mortgages and other loans).211  
Without a safety net, a failure of investor confidence creates 
financial panics where people seek to withdraw money from the 
system.212 This forces banks into a liquidity crisis where they must 
liquidate their illiquid assets, often below market value.213 It also 
forces them to keep more money in reserve because of higher risk, 
thus lowering capital available for lending.214 Although the Federal 
Reserve and the federal regulatory agencies have helped to stabilize 
the system since the Great Depression, the system is still vulnerable to 
                                                 
207 In re Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 642-43. 
208 Several commentators already feel the OTS and the OCC have exceeded 
their Congressional mandates and are in the midst of a power grab from the states. 
See, e.g. Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National 
Bank Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
981 (Summer 2006); Reardon, supra note 11, at 363-64; Donald C. Lampe, Federal 
Preemption and the Future of Mortgage Loan Regulation, 59 BUS. LAW. 1297 (May 
2004); Berg, supra note 21, at 502. 
209 Economics Focus: When to Bail Out, ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2007, at 90. 
210 See generally BENJAMIN BERNANKE, ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
(2d prtg. 2004). 
211 Economics Focus: When to Bail Out, supra note 209, at 90. 
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shocks—largely from new financial instruments that are largely 
unregulated.215 Today, those instruments, worth nearly $1 trillion, are 
losing hundreds of billions of dollars per month in value, and are 
increasingly forcing banks to horde money—similar to banking 
behavior during the Great Depression.216 
It is also important to remember that banks and S&Ls are 
businesses—driven by their shareholders to create new capital. 
Without regulation, banks—the pillars of capitalism—would act like 
any other business and seek to maximize profit by minimizing daily 
operating costs.  In other words, banks have an incentive to reduce 
deposits held in reserve to only the amount necessary to meet daily 
operating costs and lend the remainder to generate more profit.  While 
this may be fine for normal operations, in the event of a run on the 
bank, the bank would not be able to meet its obligations and could 
collapse.217 Part of the original mandate in HOLA is to ensure the 
“safe and sound operation, and regulation of savings associations.”218 
This can only be done when regulations require banks to hold enough 
cash in reserve to meet at least mild “rainy day” obligations. 
Of course, agreeing that there needs to be regulation is not 
agreeing to how much regulation is proper. On the one hand are those, 
including the OTS, who favor only allowing federal regulation. They 
argue that if the regulation is “too hot” (i.e. states get in the business of 
requiring additional regulations of federally-backed S&Ls), it would 
hinder both the OTS’ mandate to provide a stable and uniform system 
of national regulation and could deter growth in the industry by 
forcing S&Ls to contend with a plethora or national and state 
                                                 
215 Bill Gross, Beware our Shadow Banking System, FORTUNE, 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/27/newsmakers/gross_banking.fortune/index.htm?po
stversion=2007112807 (last modified Nov. 28, 2007). An example would be 
collateralized debt obligations—the method by which prime and sub-prime loans 
were “repackaged” and sold. 
216 Id; compare BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 62-64. 
217 See generally BENJAMIN BERNANKE, ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
(2d prtg. 2004); see also Economics Focus: When to Bail Out, supra note 209, at 90. 
218 12 U.S.C. § 1463(a)(1) (2000). 
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regulations.219 Those in favor of greater state regulation argue that if 
the states are preempted from asserting any power over federal S&Ls 
and the OTS has only limited enforcement authority, then consumers 
have no recourse or recovery when S&Ls do commit civil torts.220 The 
lack of private causes of action provides incentive for S&Ls to 
maximize profits with little or no concern for the consumer.221 
The days of little or no regulation are well behind the United 
States. Banks and the federal government have entered into a 
“regulatory pact”—the federal government agrees to guarantee a 
bank’s deposits and in return, the bank submits to regulation.222 
Similarly, the central banks in the United States and other countries 
have successfully fought inflation for much of the past thirty years—
leading to complacency and a belief that inflation will stay low and the 
central banks will step in whenever there is trouble.223 But the United 
States is still a vast territory with widely diverse economies—at best, 
federal regulations are a compromise and are not what will work best 
in all situations. 
Perhaps most interestingly, according to many modern 
macroeconomists, the current financial climate looks eerily similar to 
the climate that supposedly triggered the Great Depression.224 In the 
1920’s, consumers increasingly tapped home equity and credit because 
the money was easily available.225 When the stock market crashed and 
prices began to destabilize, those same consumers were spooked and 
also began to devote proportionately more money to their debt 
                                                 
219 Wilmarth, supra note 104, at 285-86, see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(a), 
1464(a) (2000). 
220 See generally Fisher, supra note 208; In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC 
Mortgage Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2007).  
221 Economics Focus: When to Bail Out, supra note 209, at 90; CSI: Credit 
Crunch, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2007, A Special Report on the World Economy 3, at 
6-7 (noting that regulations that do not ensure financial consequences “encourages 
excessive risk-taking”). 
222 Economics Focus: When to Bail Out, supra note 209, at 90. 
223 See generally Heroes of the Zeroes, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2007, Special 
Report on the World Economy 8, at 8-16. 
224 See generally BERNANKE, supra note 199. 
225 BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 46. 
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repayments.226 With less money to spend on discretionary purchases, 
demand declined and credit tightened, which caused further 
deflation.227 Similarly, banks were afraid of runs and insolvency, and 
thus held more money in reserve and lent money to only the most 
credit-worthy customers.228 
Part of Congress’ intent in enacting HOLA was to standardize 
lending practices to specifically avoid speculative lending and to 
restore the banking industry to solid footing.229 Arguably, HOLA and 
the OTS managed to do just that, and, with the help of the Federal 
Reserve, managed the U.S. economy fairly well. However, by the end 
of the century, lending credit standards were once again irrationally 
loose.230 Headlines for much of 2007 have been concerned with the 
fact that the average United States consumer had—for the first time in 
history—a negative savings rate and the effect that exotic loans and 
easy credit will have now that housing prices are deflating and credit is 
“crunched.”231 In England, for the first time in approximately 150 
years, there was a run on a bank.232 All these factors contribute to a 
feeling that the world economy is fragile, although it is unlikely that 
America or the world would see another Great Depression. The fact 
that Congress is once again talking about a bailout of consumers for 
defaulting mortgages shows that, at some level, HOLA and the OTS 
failed to adequately regulate the system. 
There are other interests as well, however, and the consumer is 
only one side of the coin. Banks and federal S&Ls are, at the end of 
the day, businesses and as such need an incentive to actually operate—
primarily profits. Forcing federal S&Ls to comply with a myriad of 
state regulations as well as federal regulations runs the risk of creating 
an overregulated industry and could create excessive litigation that 
                                                 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 See id. at 62-65. During this period, even people with good credit who were 
a low credit risk found it increasingly difficult to get loans and mortgages. Id. 
229 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(a), 1464(a) (2000). 
230 CSI: Credit Crunch, supra note 221, at 6-7. 
231 Id. at 6. 
232 Id. at 8. 
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would discourage S&Ls from operating, lessen competition, and 
generally harm the economy as a whole. 
This still leaves us with whether the Seventh Circuit managed to 
strike an appropriate balance that will maximize both judicial and 
economic efficiency across the spectrum of players and what 
implications the court’s new approach to banking regulation is likely 
to have on regulatory enforcement within the court’s jurisdiction. It 
seems likely that, on the whole, the court managed to find a workable 
balance between state and federal regulation. The court’s analysis of 
the claims makes clear that it is willing to allow states at least some 
regulatory authority.233 It appears that the court feels that the states, 
and not the federal government, is best able to determine how to 
protect the interests of its citizens and that, at any rate, federal 
protection is inadequate.234 The state law claims that the court allows 
(i.e. fraud, breach of contract, etc.) are claims that are typically 
associated with “bad actors” in business.235 Banks are the engines of 
capitalism, but they are still businesses—and, like any business, 
should be answerable to their customers. 
Banks are central to the economy, but they occupy a unique 
position—the federal government insures their deposits to provide the 
general population with the security of knowing their money will 
always be available, but this insurance also means that banks are free 
to take greater risks with those deposits.236 The federal government 
will bail them out if their loans go bad and they fail to meet their 
                                                 
233 See generally In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litig., 
491 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2007). 
234 See generally In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d 638; see also On Credit Watch, 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2007, Special Report on the World Economy 3, at 26-34 
(arguing that lending regulation is to blame for much of the credit crunch in 2007 
and that updates to the regulatory scheme are needed to avoid future economic 
crises); Bill Gross, Beware our Shadow Banking System, FORTUNE, 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/27/newsmakers/gross_banking.fortune/index.htm?po
stversion=2007112807 (last modified Nov. 28, 2007) (arguing that much of the 
threat to the banking system results from no regulation of risky investments, such as 
collateralized debt obligations). 
235 See generally In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d 638. 
236 Economics Focus: When to Bail Out,supra note 209, at 90. 
35
Attaway: Cracking the Door to State Recovery from Federal Thrifts
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 
 310
obligations.237 Thus, even though there is federal regulation, the 
system encourages banks to take ever larger risks, often at the expense 
of their consumers and sometimes without being honest about their 
true motives. By allowing state law claims that implicate good 
business practices, the Seventh Circuit attempts to correct for the 
above market distortion.  Forcing banks to be more accountable to 
their consumers makes them less likely to engage in questionable 
business practices out of fear of litigation. Here, the Seventh Circuit 
seems to have struck an appropriate balance between ensuring that 
American thrifts can compete with foreign banks and ensuring that 
they are not given free reign to run amok. 
 
PART IV: CONCLUSION 
 
For good or ill, Judge Posner is a paragon of the Chicago School 
of legal reasoning and is widely recognized as a staunch proponent of 
using the law to create economic efficiency. Here, Judge Posner seems 
at his best. He holds as clearly preempted those statutes and common 
law actions that could lead to conflicting state and federal regulations 
or that may encroach on the efficacy of the federal regulations.238 At 
the same time, his fluid application of what it means to incidentally 
affect lending operations provides consumers with the one thing 
HOLA and the OTS lack, private causes of action against bad acting 
S&Ls. The courts have indicated which types of claims it feels should 
be allowed, and that, unlike many other courts, it will allow some 
measure of consumer protection. Ultimately, this will strengthen the 
banking system by making S&Ls more accountable to their customers 
and less likely to zealously advocate exotic or risky loans without full 
disclosure. In short, the Seventh Circuit’s compromise sacrifices short 
term gain for long term growth. 
The test articulated by the court redraws the lines of when, and 
how, the OTS can preempt state law actions. Judge Posner and the 
court have made it easier for plaintiffs to bring actions against S&Ls 
                                                 
237 See generally Lessons from the Credit Crunch, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2007, 
Special Report on the World Economy. 
238 In re Ocwen II, 491 F.3d at 645-48. 
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by allowing them to recover for claims based on state laws that come 
from a vital state interest.239 Although not all claims may go forward, 
even under this rubric, it is significantly less deferential than past 
precedent. It does not dismiss the state law claims out of hand. It also 
provides—through the courts—an important check on the power of a 
single regulatory agency to set policy with impunity.  
The degree to which those state law claims are allowed to move 
forward will depend on how courts choose to interpret the OTS’ 
assertion that it can preempt almost all state law. If more courts follow 
the less deferential position of the Seventh Circuit, the overall benefit 
may be that banks are less reliant on the government and are 
ultimately healthier institutions.  Allowing at least some state law 
claims to go forward will force banks to become more accountable to 
their ultimate consumer, the American people. The Seventh Circuit has 
started down the path to ensuring that, like other businesses, banks 
must answer to those whom they serve. 
 
                                                 
239 Id. at 643-45. 
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